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Introduction 
The West German postwar political consensus was shaken in the 1970s by a wave 
of citizen protest.  The protest was often directed at large, state-sponsored industrial 
projects such as nuclear and coal-fired power plants.  Citizens objected not only to the 
environmental degradation caused by these projects, but also to a system of planning that 
excluded local residents from decisions that would affect the character of their 
communities.  In this sense the protest was about democratic legitimacy.  Focusing on the 
city of Berlin, I argue that the protests of the 1970s and 1980s resulted in both a more 
activist citizenry and a more participatory planning process.  I then examine how 
participation in land-use planning has evolved in Berlin since German unification.  I find 
that, while the desire to mitigate conflict has led planners to incorporate local citizen 
input, institutional and attitudinal barriers to inclusive, effective planning remain which 
keep the legitimation issue alive.  Grassroots protest is still an oft-used and necessary tool 
to draw attention to the local effects of development decisions and to democratic deficits 
in the planning process. 
This article draws connections between the social movement  and urban planning 
literatures, which have remained largely separate.  Cases of local conflict in land-use 
planning can speak to important questions about the nature of citizen participation in 
industrialized democracies.  A look at citizen protest around planning issues over a thirty-
year span in Berlin reveals the following: 
  1.  Protesters intentionally politicized areas of policy making that had formerly been 
accepted as the purview of technical experts.  The Berlin case shows how the protests of 
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the 1970s linked the goals of grassroots democracy and community quality of life in a 
way that has had lasting impact on the land-use planning process.  The protesters asserted 
that only a democratic decision making process could produce legitimate and competent 
policy.  This is a significant change from the technocratic mentality of the past, and it sits 
uneasily with the government goal of increasing bureaucratic efficiency. 
  2.  Citizen protest is commonly viewed in the social movement literature as temporary 
or cyclical:  As governments react to protest, either by suppressing it or by engaging in 
bargaining with the movements, the mobilization dies down.  In fact, the movements of 
the 1970s in Germany did professionalize somewhat and become more a part of 
institutionalized politics.  Protest mobilization, however,  did not disappear in the ensuing 
decades, but rather, as Dieter Rucht points out, also became part of the "normal" 
repertoire of local citizens.1  A look at the evolution of local planning politics in a single 
city over time helps explain this result.  Citizen and state roles have both changed in 
Berlin; citizen participation is taken more seriously, while the state behaves less 
autonomously.  This is a difference that the mobilization of the 1970s produced.  But the 
struggle to find a workable, legitimate forum for citizen participation continues.  New 
political parties and increased participation requirements in planning have not proven 
adequate.  Grassroots protests are still commonly mounted in the name of community 
empowerment against what many see as unwanted encroachments by an industrial-
bureaucratic growth machine.  
The Berlin case yields insights into land-use politics in Germany as a whole.  
While the city's history is in some ways unique, in other, important ways Berlin is a kind 
of extreme case that can be instructive generally.  The conditions that produced 
grassroots protest around land-use nationwide were particularly acute here.  Hemmed in 
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by the infamous Wall, West Berlin in the 1970s and 1980s faced the challenges of 
urbanization without the means to disperse the negative effects.  The state government's 
decision to expand the city's electrical capacity in hopes of fostering industrial growth 
would have negative implications for a substantial part of the population no matter where 
a new power plant was sited. The environmental costs of continued economic expansion 
became especially apparent where industry and populace were forced to coexist in a 
limited space.  West Berliners also had little chance of influencing planning decisions by 
the neighboring East German government whose consequences they, too, would suffer.  
In this way the walled-in city served as a kind of future scenario for other urbanized areas 
whose environmental problems transcended their political borders and whose ability to 
deal with them by dispersion was limited.  The "economy-ecology conflict" that 
prompted the rise of the environmental movement nationwide was particularly acute in 
West Berlin and produced a particularly active grassroots protest scene.  But the kind of 
protest that occurred in Berlin also occurred around other large industrial projects and 
was responsible in part for the nationwide boom in grassroots organizations and the 
founding of green/alternative political groupings. 
Today, too, Berlin faces magnified land-use problems which continue to spark 
grassroots protest.  The challenges of unification are particularly stark in the only major 
German metropolitan area containing both eastern and western components.  The sudden 
opening of borders to a sparsely populated hinterland has also made clear the need for 
functioning regional land-use planning. Here, too, Berlin holds lessons for the rest of 
Germany in its search for effective participatory planning instruments.  
Bureaucratic/political attempts to streamline planning clash with citizens' demands to 
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shape their own community.  The study begins by describing the conditions that sparked 
the mass mobilization of the 1970s. 
 
West German Land-Use Planning and the Rise of Citizen Protest 
While the federal government sets the general framework for land-use planning, 
the concrete details are developed at state (Land) and local levels.  Zoning, urban 
development, and landscape management are the responsibility of municipalities and 
counties. All matters involving the local governments are constitutionally their 
responsibility except where specifically assigned to other levels of government.2  Mutual 
cooperation, however,  is the norm.  Alan Norton writes, "important as the separation of 
powers between territorial levels may be in law, in political terms there is...an 
intertwining of activities...and a high degree of interdependence between the Bund, 
Länder and local government and between them and other sectoral interests..."3 City-
states like Berlin are exceptional in that they possess state and local governments at the 
same time.  Under the state government, which in Berlin is called the Senate (Senat), are 
city districts (Bezirke); while city districts lack independent fiscal power, they do 
participate in land-use planning.  It was the state government of West Berlin, though, 
which controlled the administrative planning process in the 1970s, when our story begins.  
In this period the sectoral interests involved in the siting process were mostly energy 
firms themselves.  The shared federal and state priority of economic growth led these 
authorities to want to expand energy capacity even in the face of stagnant demand.  
The 1970s also saw the rise of social movements organized not along traditional 
lines of economic conflict, but around new issues of quality of life and a critique of 
growth.4  The upsurge in citizen protest began as West Germany's "economic miracle" 
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slowed and information on the harmful effects of pollution became widely available.  
Many local populations began to question the government's continued support of 
industrial growth at the expense of the natural environment and to formulate their critique 
in terms of an economy/ecology conflict.  Local residents formed "citizen initiative" 
groups.  These were generally single-issue neighborhood or local groups organized either 
to procure some service for the community or, as was overwhelmingly the case beginning 
in the early 1970s, to protest some government-sponsored project or policy.  Near 
Frankfurt's busy international airport, plans to deforest a recreational area in order to 
construct a new runway drew mass protest.  In West Berlin, a freeway extension project 
was blocked for decades by residents' objections.  Mass mobilization reached its height in 
the protest against nuclear energy facilities, including reactors at Wyhl, Brokdorf, 
Grohnde, and Kalkar and recycling facilities at Gorleben and later Wackersdorf.  At their 
peak, the environmental demonstrations drew hundreds of thousands of participants.5  
Although the energy issue most clearly evoked critique of the growth mentality, 
energy protest was embedded in a larger array of citizen movements concerned with the 
quality of life and critical of what Jürgen Habermas termed the economic and 
administrative "system".6  Women's rights, civil rights, antiwar, and labor groups had  
proliferated in the 1960s.  Urban centers such as West Berlin became centers of a thriving 
left-wing student movement and alternative culture.  Although there was little overlap 
between the protest groups of the 1960s and the environmental citizen initiatives of the 
1970s, some of the later groups built on the communication network established by 
especially the left-wing organizations.  The peace movement, composed of a variety of 
smaller groups, also emerged strongly in the 1970s and early 1980s, particularly after the 
stationing of nuclear missiles on West German soil.7 Disgruntled citizens began to 
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question not only the substance of government decisions, but also the legitimacy of the 
form of decision making that produced them.  They blamed the tight relationship between 
government and industry for policy decisions unrepresentative of the values of much of 
the population.  They increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, 
which in their view had failed to transmit new impulses from the citizenry to political 
decision makers.  The view spread among the activists that the problems were not merely 
a passing phase but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in 
the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."8 
  By the mid-1970s more people described themselves as members of citizen 
initiatives than of all political parties combined.9  Although the average participant was 
well educated and middle class, these groups contained a broad cross-section of citizens.  
While they opposed technocratic decision making, they were not generally backward 
looking; they supported technological solutions to environmental problems so long as 
these were reached democratically.  Grassroots groups developed a broad palette of 
political activities, including petition campaigns, nature walks, information booths, 
demonstrations, site occupations, and festivals.  Some of the left-wing and other citizen 
groups joined environmentalists to found new political parties and voting lists in the late 
1970s, culminating in the 1980 formation of the national-level Greens. 
The federal government responded with anti-pollution and construction legislation 
containing expanded provisions for citizen participation.  Additions to the Federal Air 
Pollution Law linked the permit requirements for polluting facilities; now proposals 
would have to include precautions against environmental damage in order to qualify for 
construction permits.  This change closed a loophole that had often allowed projects to 
begin construction before their environmental impacts had been assessed.  The new law 
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permitted citizens to file objections, provided they could show that the proposed project 
would affect them negatively. 
 
Energy Controversy in West Berlin 
In this setting, the controversy arose that would help reshape West Berlin politics.  
Berlin Power and Light (BEWAG) announced in the mid-1970s its most ambitious project 
to date, a planned 1,200 megawatt coal-fired plant to be built in a forested area in the 
northwest corner of the city.  Rising demand, the utility claimed, mandated immediate 
expansion if the city were to avert an energy shortage.  The subsequent debate over the 
construction revealed a conflict between the goal of revitalizing West Berlin's lagging 
industrial sector, a goal to which a plentiful and secure energy supply could contribute, 
and the goal of reversing the deterioration of the natural environment, whose 
accomplishment the project could hinder.  The former goal clearly took priority among 
policymakers in the West Berlin state government, the latter among a substantial portion 
of the citizenry. 
There were limited sites available on which to build the city's largest plant.  The 
property chosen was away from residential areas but was squarely in the middle one of 
the largest areas of contiguous forest in the city.  The initial siting choice was made by 
the Senate's energy bureaucracy,  which was also the main permit authority for power 
plants, together with the utility.  The public reaction was immediate and explosive:  
nearby residents formed a citizen intiative group that drew citywide attention to the site 
through demonstrations, information booths, weekend nature walks through the 
threatened forest, tree adoptions, and, finally, site occupation.  The West Berlin group, 
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like other new social movements that formed around energy projects, linked the issues of 
environment and democracy:  
My dream is neither to have a state led by citizen initiative groups nor a 
state constituted by industry and trade interests.  My dream would be a 
government guided by the question of human survival, that would not 
push the costs of our current lifestyle onto the next generation like an 
ever-growing mountain, that would at least make an attempt to discuss the 
costs...with us instead of playing us for fools, and that would decide with 
us how these costs could be justly assigned...10 
The activists objected to the scale and location of the project and its predicted 
negative environmental effects, but they also questioned the legitimacy of the form of 
decision making that had led to these planning choices. In this way they connected the 
aims of democracy and community quality of life - only an inclusive decision making 
process, they argued, could produce sustainable, community-friendly policy.  Noting the 
negligible role of elected officials in energy policy making, the activists concentrated on 
grassroots action and direct confrontation of bureaucratic policy makers.  The West 
Berlin Senate, faced with conflicting demands from the utility and the protesters, tried to 
bypass the parliamentary and citizen-participation provisions of the permit process.  It 
exempted the utility from the legal requirement to submit a construction plan on the 
grounds that energy demand made large and rapid expansion imperative.11   
Given the nature of the protesters' objections, this was exactly the wrong move.  It 
reinforced the protesters' claim that the Senate's decisionmaking was undemocratic.  The 
group filed suit in administrative court.  Protesters literally threw themselves in front of 
bulldozers to block preliminary drilling at the forested site until the court could hear their 
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objection.  The West Berlin Administrative Court sided with the protesters.  The court 
nullified the exemptions from the citizen participation requirements of federal air 
pollution and construction laws. The judge said the energy shortage the Senate projected 
"was clearly the fault of the [Senate] itself through its own bureaucratic failures [and] 
cannot be considered an emergency situation of the kind that could justify an exemption 
from the existing planning obligations."12    
The utility downscaled the project and moved the plant site to a less 
environmentally sensitive location next to an existing plant.  The controversy then shifted 
to the permit processes.  The citizen challenge, previously expressed through mass 
mobilization, was now increasingly aimed directly at the bureaucracy's source of 
legitimacy:  its technical expertise.  The permit authorities faced difficult adjustments.  
The new federal construction and air pollution laws dispersed decision-making power 
within the Senate bureaucracy.  The Senator for Economy could no longer control the 
process as in the past; now the environmental and worker protection bureaucracies were 
also involved.  Any lack of coordination between the branches, as well as permit 
authorities' overreliance on data supplied by the utility itself, quickly came to light in the 
permit hearings. 
Citizen pressure began to stir both the administrative courts and the West Berlin 
state parliament to cast a more critical eye on utility and Senate data.  But the narrow 
technical debate frustrated the citizens' attempts to raise general questions regarding the 
form and goals of policy making.  Permit authorities were simply not required to take 
broader considerations of the goals of planning into account.  The activists increasingly 
targeted the political parties in the legislature for failing to provide an independent forum 
for energy debate and for failing to take up their institutional right to oversee Senate 
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policy making.  Local activists, including many Reuter-West protesters, formed their own 
voting list, the Alternative List (AL), which first won seats in 1981 with 7.2% of the vote.  
AL members immediately brought the planning/energy debate to parliament. The AL 
prompted the formation of two special commissions to study energy policy and to prepare 
the legislature to take on its supervisory role.13   
The biggest challenge for the utility was complying with air pollution standards.  
BEWAG was able to do that by modernizing or shutting down parts of older plants while 
constructing the new one at half the originally proposed capacity.  West Berlin's already 
marginal air quality would not be worsened, and in some parts of the city would actually 
improve, through these measures.  This was a victory for citizen activism.  The 
controversy also forced the government to comply with the new federal laws by including 
a wider range of considerations in individual planning decisions.  This change would also 
invite a wider range of participants into the process.  The need for a more synoptic 
approach became clear during the legal battle.  The activists' viewpoint repeatedly won 
the support of the courts.  Plant opponents won a further victory, for example, when the 
administrative court voided the construction permits on grounds that the permit 
authorities had failed to take air pollution control standards into account in awarding 
them.  The authorities had argued that environmental considerations belonged to a 
separate permit process under air pollution law and were not properly part of construction 
permitting.  Federal law no longer allowed these authorities to compartmentalize different 
aspects of planning.14  Likewise, the open discussion of interests - how, for example, 
environmental and economic concerns should be weighed in planning - became part of 
the legal as well as the parliamentary discussion.  It was now considered irresponsible for 
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elected officials not to examine critically the planning decisions of the bureaucracy and 
the utility.   
The universal recognition that energy policy involves choices between political 
goals was in part the achievement of a decade of legal wrangling over the Reuter-West 
power plant.  The protesters and the AL intentionally politicized what had been a 
technical discussion.  They connected in the public mind grassroots democracy in 
planning with community quality of life.  
  
Results of 1970s-1980s Grassroots Protest in West Berlin and Nationwide 
The West Berlin controversy occurred in the context of widespread grassroots 
protest against state-sponsored industrial projects.  Everywhere, the protesters challenged 
not only the negative environmental consequences of planning decisions but also the 
legitimacy of the technocratic planning system. Citizen protest led to the founding of 
green and alternative parties and networks of citizen groups throughout West Germany.  
These parties formed a lasting tie between the challengers and the political 
establishment.15  Pushed by the new activists, parliaments in almost all the federal states 
established principles and guiding goals for land-use planning.16  In West Berlin, the AL 
augmented its support through the 1980s and became part of a short-lived governing 
coalition with the Social Democrats in 1989.17  The AL, though, like many green and 
alternative parties, was unable to force much institutional change in the democratizing 
direction the citizen movements wanted.  
  Citizen protest like that in West Berlin did result in substantive changes to the 
planning process. Since the 1970s, a wide range of building, planning, and environmental 
legislation has mandated grassroots involvement in decision making.18 Environmental 
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impact tests, which incorporate public participation, have been required for particular 
projects since 1985. EU-level initiatives such as Local Agenda 21 have encouraged local 
governments to include residents in planning for sustainable development.   1998 
amendments to the Federal Planning Law and more recent administrative guidelines have 
continued the trend.  A broad range of societal actors has participated in working groups 
or steering committees that have collaborated informally with legislative and bureaucratic 
policy makers, exchanging information and recommendations.19  Mediation has become 
more common as a non-confrontational way to resolve differences.  Futures workshops 
bring different participants together to conceptualize new projects such as green belts 
surrounding urban areas.20 
Rainer Stierand writes that a new constellation of actors is especially noticeable in 
planning for major technical projects like nuclear power plants and toxic waste dumps.  
Not only is the circle of participants larger, but their interaction has changed; citizen 
initiative groups and environmental organizations have taken their place as "conflict 
partners" next to industry and economy representatives.21  He says the term 
"corporatism", commonly used to describe the kind of cooperation that occurs in 
planning, no longer captures the range of actors, which, next to the large, entrenched 
labor and capital organizations of the classical model, also now includes a wide array of 
individuals and groups that did not need to be taken into account in this form before the 
protests of the 1970s.  It also fails to capture the nature of the interaction.  These are not 
just NIMBY protesters; they are informed participants in the process.  The government's 
role in these new forms of decision making is often a good deal less authoritative than the 
corporatist model of the 1970s would indicate.  Instead, government organs now 
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commonly function more as managers, mediators, advisors, or monitors.  We have seen 
in the West Berlin case that this transition occurred largely because of citizen protest. 
Some municipal governments, including Berlin's, have actively sought 
cooperation with urban protest groups that mobilized successfully against development 
projects in the 1970s and early 80s.  Tight budgets during the Kohl years forced them to 
look for ways to lower costs, such as bringing in citizen groups to help implement their 
programs.22 Planners and applicants have generally cooperated in the measures to enhance 
local participation.  Many projects require long-term investment and long-term planning 
efforts.  Recognizing that a project may be delayed or derailed altogether by citizen 
protest,  applicants now put more effort into averting such protest and working to 
legitimate their plans by promoting citizen involvement. 
 We have seen how grassroots protest in West Berlin and throughout West 
Germany led to changes in the role of citizens in planning.  What have been the lasting 
results of that activism?  What forms does citizen participation take today in planning, 
and how are these similar to or different from those of the earlier decades?  Returning to 
the Berlin case, we will see that, despite the innovations in the process that the earlier 
movements achieved,  it has proved difficult to create a consistently inclusive 
conversation about planning in the united city. 
 
Land-Use Planning Controversies in Berlin Since 1990 
In 1990, Berlin found itself politically united and with a newly accessible 
hinterland, two enormous challenges to land-use planning.  East Germans had their own 
experiences with land-use planning whose legacy is still felt.  Discontentment over 
environmental wrongs compounded their disenchantment with what was viewed as 
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dehumanizing residential planning and likely contributed to the downfall of the East 
German regime.23  With unification, city planning had to be rethought from the ground 
up.  The public showed great interest in how the new Berlin would look, and the Senate 
took pains to initiate a general conversation. The City Forum was launched in 1990 as an 
advisory body to the Senator for City Planning and Environmental Protection.24  Run by a 
steering committee of five professional planners, its sixty members - "personalities from 
important political venues in the city" - discussed predetermined planning topics before a 
largely mute audience.  Residents pilloried the City Forum for functioning more as a 
legitimating tool for Senate planning than as a public forum.  Only after 1995 was its 
structure decentralized.  The Forum was recently reconvened after a hiatus of several 
years.  It remains to be seen whether it can become a vehicle for citywide 
communication.  
One accomplishment of the 1970s movements was to activate parliament as a 
locus of discussion.  The AL, which formally became part of Alliance 90/The Greens 
after unification, has tried to keep planning on the parliamentary agenda and in the public 
consciousness. Berlin has had a volatile political party scene, moving from social-
democratic to conservative-led coalition governments in the 1980s, to a short-lived red-
green coalition of SPD and AL in 1989, to conservative-led "grand coalitions" with the 
SPD in the 1990s and finally to a left/center-left coalition of SPD and the revamped 
socialist party of the east, PDS, since 2001.  None of these coalitions has achieved much 
change in the role of parties and parliaments in planning.  While the movements have a 
continuing liaison to parliament through the Greens, the Greens have been unable to 
expand the role of the legislature in planning beyond what they achieved in the 1980s.  
While the planning process has become more complex, with more bureaucratic as well as 
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more private participants, it is still quite opaque.  The trend since the 1990s has been 
away from party/parliamentary control and toward public/private partnerships. 
 It became clear during the Reuter-West controversy that bureaucracy's role in 
planning was also problematic, both in coordinating the process and in including citizen 
voices. As a city-state with both district and state-level planning authorities, Berlin has 
formidable coordination challenges.  Recognizing the need for institutional reform, the 
Berlin Senate recently began a wide-ranging program of "administrative modernization."  
The goal, according to the Senate, is to model government after private business:  to 
streamline its organization and outsource some of its functions, to increase its flexibility 
and responsiveness, and  to reduce inefficiencies.  One of the targeted sources of 
inflexibility and inefficiency was the micromanagement of bureaucratic action by the 
political branch.  The Senate aimed to remove the parliament from the day-to-day 
functioning of the administration, having it guide the administration instead through 
general agreements about goals.25  Ironically, this was exactly the institutional avenue that 
the activists of the 1970s had opened up - they had forced parliaments to take up their 
function as overseer of the bureaucracy and to lead a discussion of goals as well as the 
appropriate means for achieving them.  The latest reforms seemed aimed at preserving 
the goal-setting function while putting the details back in the hands of the bureaucracy, 
thereby restoring some of the technocratic features the activists had tried to curtail. 
The Senate also took steps to improve lateral communication between 
bureaucratic branches.  In the Reuter-West case, the state government's new 
environmental responsibilities complicated and lengthened the approval process.  
Construction authorities had to consider environmental effects in their deliberations, and 
environmental permits were now required under federal law.  As more bureaucratic 
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authorities have become involved in planning, and more efforts have been made to 
decentralize the process, the interval from application to construction has skyrocketed.  
Werner Klinge writes about the construction plan approval process in the western Berlin 
district of Charlottenburg, where the average length of the process is now eight years and 
four months.  This extraordinary slowness cannot be blamed on increased citizen 
participation requirements.  It is more the result of new district planning responsibilities 
and new requirements for coordination between district and state authorities.26 Elizabeth 
Strom explains that the local bureaucratic agencies, set up to operate largely 
independently of one another, have developed different institutional cultures that are hard 
to reconcile.27  The problem we saw in the 1970s of coordinating the work of different 
administrative branches has not been solved; if anything it has worsened. 
Licensing authorities have, as in the Reuter-West case of the 1970s, often tried to 
accelerate the process by exempting applications from some required steps.  This poses a 
continuing problem for citizen participation.  In the Charlottenburg example,  says 
Klinge, consensus among the political and bureaucratic authorities is so difficult to 
achieve that the construction authorities often issue legally questionable exemptions in 
order to keep the process moving.  But such actions weaken the legitimacy of 
construction decisions, just as they did in the past.28    
Outsourcing is supposed to help alleviate red tape and improve lateral 
communication in the bureaucracy.  A form of outsourcing was used in the 
redevelopment of  Adlershof in the 1990s.  Adlershof is a large, mixed-use area of 
southeastern Berlin.  The Senate wanted to site a large business and science park there 
which would also include university institutes and even housing.  The mix of uses 
mandated the participation of several branches of the state administration, and, according 
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to Katja Simons, conflicts between them plagued the initial stages of the project.29  In 
order to alleviate the problems of coordinating bureaucratic activity and to consolidate 
expertise on the details of the complex project, the Senate formed a development agency 
to act as trustee for the state government.  The Senate would bear the costs and the risks 
of the development, but this new entity would make the relevant private contacts and 
decisions.30  This was supposed to accelerate the process and make it more flexible and 
closer to market actors.  But it also removed the process from popular control, thus 
reintroducing the legitimation problem.  As Berlin's economy stagnated in the 1990s, the 
development authority insisted on ever more control and greater public investment.  
Neither the Senate nor the Berlin parliament could monitor the increasingly controversial 
investment effectively.  The creation of the development agency was an attempt to 
circumvent hierarchical, inflexible planning in the name of efficiency.  The legitimacy of 
the project suffered, however, from a lack of accountability. 
Even where citizen participation requirements are fulfilled, the timing of the 
participation may nullify its effectiveness.  Simons says the formal citizen participation in 
the Adlershof project was designed mostly to win consensus for decisions already made.  
With regard to office-space planning in the united city, Uwe Altrock similarly finds that 
the Berlin state government involves the legislature and the public only at a stage where 
the important decisions about a project have already been reached.31  This does not mean, 
however, that residents' interests are not taken into account at all.  Some planning 
alternatives are rejected out of hand by the authorities in anticipation of citizen 
objections.  This practice, says Altrock, distinguishes current planning from that of 
previous decades.  Those early deliberations are not communicated effectively to the 
public, however, which only sees the lack of accommodation in later project stages.  The 
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difference from the 1970s is that compromises are made in anticipation of public protest.  
The similarity is that the state's attempt to avoid conflict leaves a legitimation deficit with 
frustrated citizens, who see no choice but to protest. 
The Berlin state bureaucracy has also increasingly tried informal and direct 
instruments of cooperation with the movements themselves.  Margit Mayer describes 
how the Senate in the 1980s promoted cooperation with some of the groups that had 
protested in the 1970s, including citizen initiatives, tenant groups, housing activists,  and 
squatters.  The Senate was interested mainly in lowering costs and avoiding conflict with 
grassroots groups by outsourcing certain functions directly to them.  Some Berlin citizen 
groups formed an umbrella organization to try for public funding for their projects.  
Aware that the Senate was trying to coopt them, they framed their demands initially in 
opposition to the "new voluntarism" of the conservative government.32  The included 
groups did tend to become more professionalized, opening new lines of conflict between 
them and other, excluded groups.  The grassroots scene was thus partially but not entirely 
coopted by the bureaucracy. 
In sum, the controversies of the earlier decades in Berlin contributed substantially 
to the more recent reforms.  These include changes in the role of parliaments, efforts to 
overcome bureaucratic red tape, and efforts to establish a more direct relationship 
between planning/licensing authorities and the public.  Not all of these were designed to 
allow citizens to take part more substantively.  As the above examples show, the efforts 
to increase communication with citizens while also increasing efficiency in planning have 
been problematic.  Despite enhanced citizen participation in formal planning, there is still 
no institutionalized forum for a real, ongoing conversation between community residents, 
politicians, bureaucrats, and applicants during the planning process.  Therefore, 
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grassroots mobilization still has an important role to play in forcing a public conversation 
about planning and achieving a sense of local control over residents' own destiny. Only 
when mass mobilization occurs around an application, Altrock says for the case of office 
space planning, do citizen misgivings get much of a hearing; otherwise, residents' 
participation in the process is trivialized and their suggestions largely ignored. When 
diverse groups come together in protest, such as happened with the "NOlympia" 
campaign against Berlin's bid to host the 2000 Olympics, they can force a conversation 
about the broader goals of planning.  Groups like this "tend to go beyond particular 
community interests and...raise questions of democratic planning that urban elites 
concerned with interregional and international competitiveness would like to 
downplay."33  
A good number of the new grassroots groups are in the former East Berlin, where 
protest activity has followed a trajectory similar to that in the west.34  Grassroots protest 
has also begun to occur more frequently at the edges of the metropolis, and it seems to be 
following the familiar pattern in which local groups raise general questions of democracy 
and community empowerment.   Here, as in the city proper, citizen mobilization has 
functioned as a corrective to higher-level and local planning that fails to take the wishes 
of local populations into account.   
Ulf Matthiesen writes about a citizen movement in Grünow, a municipality on 
southeastern edge of Berlin.  The local planning authorities had scheduled Grünow for 
infill development that included large amounts of residential and commercial 
construction.  A residents' group mobilized successful protest against the "unecological-
oversized" local development policy and "immoderate" land-use and construction plans.  
Reminiscent of the citizen initiative group that opposed Reuter-West, the Grünau 
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protesters came to connect a grassroots democratic planning process with ecologically 
sound planning outcomes.  They advocated a nonhierarchical, citizen-centered politics 
and sustainable development.  This normative position, says Matthiesen, widened their 
mobilization potential.35 Recognizing the need for unified regional planning, the states of 
Berlin and Brandenburg had combined their planning authorities in 1995.  In keeping 
with the land-use politics of the more recent period, the Grünau group forged a strategic 
alliance with planners in the joint Berlin/Brandenburg administration, who looked 
askance at the outsized development plans proffered by the local government.  Activists 
needed both grassroots protest and cooperation with government actors to achieve their 
goals. 
 
Results of Land-Use Planning Controversies Since 1990 in Berlin and Nationwide 
Some of the issues that inspired the grassroots protest of the 1970s in Berlin 
remain unresolved, and recent trends have focused renewed public attention on them.  
The Berlin case reflects nationwide trends in planning policy and citizen participation.  
Primary among the ongoing issues is the difficulty of finding an institutional forum for 
citizen participation.  The Greens still advocate for environmental and community 
interests.  But their success in activating parliament as supervisor of planning is 
threatened by the new trend toward outsourcing planning functions.  Moreover, political 
parties are increasingly problematic as public mouthpieces for community concerns.  
Party membership has dropped off, and voter participation has declined steadily in Berlin 
and elsewhere since the 1970s.36  In a recent survey, only 32 per cent of respondents said 
they could imagine joining a political party, while 51 per cent said they'd consider joining 
a citizens' action group.37  Unmediated forms of local citizen participation, such as 
 21 
referenda, are becoming more popular.  Many states also now permit the pooling of votes 
on the ballot, which allows citizens to vote for candidates from more than one party or 
candidates not at the top of the party list. Direct election of mayors has strengthened the 
office of mayor vis a vis local councils at the expense of party influence. 
  Declining interest in political parties and in partisan elections does not mean 
declining participation per se.  In Berlin, citizen mobilization around land-use issues has 
continued.  This is true of Germany generally, both with land use and with other issues 
advocated by new social movements.   Contrary to expectations,  writes Dieter Rucht,  
"such movements have maintained their resources and infrastructures and even grown in 
some domains, such as environmental protection."38  Moreover, the structures and forms 
of protest popularized by citizen initiatives have now been adopted by some mainstream 
groups - such as police unions and professional groups - who never shared the broader 
ideological critique raised by the protest movements.  Where parties and bureaucracy are 
increasingly viewed with suspicion, these less formal instruments are becoming more 
popular:  "Political involvement is hardly decreasing, but it is being channelled less and 
less by large, formal organisations.  Instead, more flexible, looser, more contingent forms 
of engagement have become attractive,  particularly among the younger generations.  
This trend keeps movement politics alive and generates issues that are hard for parties 
and interest groups to adopt."39  
Citizens' declining interest in formal organizations coincides with the 
government's  efforts to promote informal planning instruments and cooperation with 
private actors in the planning process.  Their success can be judged in part by their 
popularity:  according to one estimate, such informal instruments now outnumber the 
official regional planning bodies four to one.40 With the amendment of the Land-Use 
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Planning Law in 1998, state and regional planning officials were instructed to promote 
cooperation between the public and private actors crucial to the successful 
implementation of land-use plans.   
Everybody pays lip service to citizen involvement; that is a result of the protests 
of the 1970s and 80s.  But the government's main goal in promoting the new cooperative, 
informal relationships is economic efficiency, while the activists' goal is more direct 
democracy.  These two goals do not work in the same direction, as we see in the Berlin 
case. "On the whole it is clear," writes Katja Simons, "that the implementation of large 
projects depends on certain prerequisites that systematically violate important criteria for 
democratic legitimation, such as transparence, accessibility, and participation."41  The 
new attempts to streamline bureaucracy in the direction of informal planning 
arrangements and private/public partnerships have sometimes produced the familiar 
result that local communities feel disempowered.  In Berlin, part of the streamlining 
effort has involved reducing the parliament's intervention in planning.  Less 
parliamentary oversight of bureaucracy, however,  means potentially less citizen voice; 
certain organized groups will have more direct influence, but there will be less of a 
connection to the citizenry in general.  
It is clear that planners must now take greater pains to justify their incursions into 
the community.  This has resulted in red tape; the evidence from Berlin indicates that it is 
increased bureaucratic complexity, however, rather than citizen participation, that has 
produced this result.  As the responsibilities of the administrative branch increase, the 
participants in its decision processes try to come to agreement through informal means.  
We saw this in the Adlershof, Charlottenburg and office space examples in Berlin. While 
the structure of government in Berlin makes the problem especially acute, this dynamic is 
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also evident in Germany generally.  According to Rainer Stierand, applicants often meet 
informally beforehand with planning authorities to resolve major conflicts in advance of 
the formal process.  This saves time and money but limits substantive public 
participation.  By the time the process is opened up for input from residents, the 
authorities are ready to sign off on the project; citizen participation is just window 
dressing.  "If, next to the legal and grassroots [avenues], the parliamentary possibility for 
control is also lacking, the opposite of openness in the planning process may be 
achieved."42  Thus, points out Stierand, the supposedly completely new ways of planning 
that have arisen through privatization and the shrinking of state responsibility in certain 
areas actually present some of the same challenges to substantive citizen participation 
that the old, expert-oriented policy making of the 1970s did.  They raise the legitimation 
problem anew:  "Ever more urgent is the question of how...possibilities for democratic 
control can be retained [within] the new systems of negotiation and the new functions of 
the bureaucracies."43  
  For these reasons, in Berlin and elsewhere, grassroots protest continues to be a 
necessary supplement to more institutionalized forms of participation.  The Reuter-West 
example from the 1970s and the Grünau example from the 1990s suggest that protest is 
important not only for democratic politics, but also for appropriate community planning.  
The siting battle over Reuter-West provoked a continuing discussion about what physical 
spaces (such as the forest area the plant would have bisected) are most important for the 
quality of life in the city.  Citizen activism helped scale down what would have been an 
oversized plant inappropriate to actual energy demand and destructive to West Berlin's 
limited open space. Local mobilization often forces applicants and government 
authorities to make better use of existing resources and conditions and to integrate 
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projects better into the community.  Without such mobilization, planning decisions are 
made that may exacerbate the disorientation that rapid change has already wrought. Aside 
from the mitigating the physical impacts of development,  citizen protest movements also 
try to shore up community in the face of what they see as dehumanizing bureaucratic and 
economic processes.  In the Reuter-West case, the citizen group critiqued not only the 
project at hand, but also the "industrial-technocratic growth society" that produced it.  
Matthiesen writes that some of the new groups at Berlin's eastern edges are trying to 
reassert a local identity against Europeanization and globalization processes and against 
planning decisions far removed from local context.  Contrary to those forces that seem to 
break down solidarity and belonging, these groups initiate a "re-embedding process" that 
asserts "here are my new roots."44 
Elsewhere in Germany, local involvement has also helped forestall or reshape 
projects that, in retrospect, higher-level authorities agree would have been destructive to 
local communities.  Konukiewitz and Wollmann cite the example of urban renewal, 
where "the trend towards rehabilitation of old buildings instead of their replacement has 
been brought about mainly by neighborhood residents protesting their removal and by 
planners who sympathised with them."45  Another example is spatial policy, where 
postwar state and federal governments tried to bolster lagging rural regions by developing 
an infrastructure to rival that of the more industrialized regions.  Environmental groups 
have successfully fought off such policies in an effort to preserve an ecological balance in 
an already heavily populated and industrialized country.  Blanket industrialization and 
urbanization in order to equalize economic conditions among the German federal states is 
no longer considered a worthwhile goal.   Local input has moved higher-level authorities 
to the viewpoint that developing or preserving particular special assets of a region - 
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natural assets included - can both help economically and preserve a sense of local 
character that keeps communities vital. 
 
Conclusion 
Citizen protest over three decades, in Berlin and in Germany generally, has 
achieved some important changes in land-use planning.  For one, it has delegitimated 
technocratic planning. Citizen initiative groups have legitimated grassroots participation 
and activated parliaments as a locus for a broad discussion of the goals as well as means 
of policy making.  Citizen input has also been institutionalized in planning.  There is now 
an expectation of local participation that makes the new land-use politics different from 
the old.  The struggle for a long-term forum for substantive discussion of land-use issues, 
however,  continues.  On the one hand it is clear that citizen objections are anticipated 
and the concept of citizen participation is taken seriously; on the other hand, this 
anticipation has led to new bureaucratic attempts to circumvent interaction with citizens 
which, combined with the general trend toward divesting parliaments of their duties to 
monitor the bureaucracy, look to many residents like a withdrawal of access to dialogue 
over planning.  The expanded citizen participation requirements of the permit process 
have led to attempts to anticipate citizen responses without actually involving citizens.  
This has left in some cases a legitimation deficit that will be hard to correct without 
finding a setting for real, ongoing political discussion between all the participants.  
Grassroots citizen protest is still a necessary companion and corrective to the 
institutionalized planning process.  The Berlin case helps explain why, despite new 
opportunities for direct cooperation with planning authorities, protest mobilization 
persists. 
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This article has put the planning literature in the broader context of changes in 
participatory democracy.  What connects the importance of these groups as social 
movements to their importance as participants in planning is their commitment to 
empowering citizens to shape their own communities.  The Berlin story helps explain 
Rucht's observation that protest mobilization did not die out after the boom of the 1970s 
and 80s, but rather has become part of the repertoire of citizen initiative groups and part 
of the normal planning process.  Protest often seems both more effective in individual 
cases and more legitimate to the public than party and bureaucratic channels.   
The protests of the 1970s and 80s encouraged lay citizens to take a substantive 
role in deciding issues that were previously considered the purview of technical experts.  
Our analysis of land-use planning in a single city over time highlights this important but 
under-studied result of grassroots citizen mobilization.  This result will prove lasting only 
if the public remains mobilized and informed.  The new trend toward privatization, while 
making the state less authoritative in some ways, ironically makes the public less 
empowered in others.  The informal inclusion of certain mobilized groups helps those 
groups to become part of the process, but it does little to inform the citizenry generally.  
Authorities can no longer cite the technical nature of decisions in order to exclude the 
public, but economic efficiency concerns and a preference for private interaction may 
achieve the same result.  The failure to find an institutional home for grassroots 
participation may prove a detriment to German democracy in the long run.  At the very 
least, it necessitates continued protest mobilization in order that community voices be 
heard and that democratizing demands be taken seriously. 
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